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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since it was recently addressed by both the Supreme Court and Congress,1 
one could logically assume that the extraterritorial application of the antifraud 
provisions of United States securities laws, specifically the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934,2 would be well settled. However, as is often the case, although 
theoretically logical, this assumption is realistically inaccurate.3 The passing of the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank” or 
the “Act”), including its clauses regarding extraterritorial application of the 
                                                           
 
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
1 See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, ___ U.S. ___ (2010), 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 929P, 929Y, 2010 
U.S.C.C.A.N. (124 Stat.) 1376, 1862–65, 1871 [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (amending scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
2 15 U.S.C. § 78. 
3 See, e.g., Richard W. Painter et al., When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: Initial 
Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INTL. L. 1 (2011); Daniel Zinn, Commentary: “Foreign-Cubed” 
Redux, TRADERS’ MAGAZINE ONLINE NEWS (Sept. 22, 2010), http://www.tradersmagazine.com/news/ 
sec-foreign-cubed-106356-1.html?zkPrintable=true. 
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antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), 
has cast into doubt the applicable standards and principles for primarily foreign 
securities suits.4 As a result, investors, public companies, and courts are left to sift 
through the inconsistencies to determine the legal standards applicable both 
currently and in the future. As the frequency with which transnational securities 
transactions are conducted continues to increase, the importance of discerning the 
laws applicable to the parties involved has become undeniable.  
One particular type of securities action at the forefront of the debate is known 
as a “Foreign-Cubed” (“F-Cubed”) action. These suits, typically structured as class 
actions, arise when classes consisting of foreign investors bring suit against foreign 
issuers concerning securities listed on and purchased from foreign markets.5 F-
Cubed securities classes typically attempt to utilize the limited connection of the 
claim to the United States in order to obtain a judgment under the country’s often-
favorable securities laws.6 F-Cubed actions are classified as private actions, as they 
are initiated directly by the investors.7 In contrast, public actions are initiated 
directly by the government, characteristically by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (the “SEC” or “Commission”), but occasionally by other facets of 
government such as the Department of Justice (DOJ).8 In practice, this distinction 
between public and private suits has become the vital differentiating characteristic 
in treatment by the courts and Congress.9 
The Supreme Court attempted to clarify disagreement among the lower courts 
regarding extraterritoriality of the securities laws in Morrison v. National Australia 
Bank.10 This solution was short-lived, however, as less than a month later the 
passage of Dodd-Frank and its related provisions allegedly altered the Supreme 
                                                           
 
4 Painter, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
5 Danielle Kantor, The Limits of Federal Jurisdiction and the F-Cubed Case: Adjudicating 
Transnational Securities Disputes in Federal Courts, 65 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 839, 841–42 
(2010). 
6 Id. at 844–46; see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. 
7 See Kantor, supra note 5. 
8 Id. at 853 n.66 (citing Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) (“[The 
Supreme Court] has long recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal antifraud 
securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions 
brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC).”)). 
9 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; Dodd-Frank Act §§ 929P, 929Y. 
10 130 S. Ct. 2869. 
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Court’s ruling.11 While some disagreement exists concerning Dodd-Frank’s actual 
effect on public suits,12 this question is ancillary to the issue of its effect on private 
suits.13 In order to fully understand the consequences of this recent legislation on 
the current state of the law and its extraterritorial application in private suits, it is 
helpful to first consider the standard applicable to public suits—although this 
standard is not necessarily binding on private suits.14 Dodd-Frank requires that the 
SEC conduct a study regarding the appropriate standard for private suits and report 
the results to Congress, which must then determine whether or not to draft 
legislation to address the issue.15 
At the outset of this note, Part II provides a brief overview of the Exchange 
Act provisions at issue and the treatment of transnational securities actions by 
courts prior to the Morrison decision. Part III discusses the Morrison decision, 
specifically the reasoning behind the approach chosen by the Court and the 
competing claims at the time of the decision. In Part IV of this note, the provisions 
of Dodd-Frank relating to extraterritorial application of United States securities 
laws are analyzed and discussed in light of their potential impact to this issue. 
Included in Part IV is a general analysis of the dispute regarding the effect of 
Dodd-Frank on public suits, the treatment of these suits moving forward, and the 
effect (or lack thereof) of this dispute on the law governing private suits. Part V 
discusses the future of extraterritorial application of the securities laws in private 
suits. Specifically, an analysis of the method of SEC investigation is presented, 
followed by a discussion of the likely result of that investigation. While this 
discussion illustrates that a strong possibility exists that the SEC will recommend 
                                                           
 
11 Dodd-Frank Act §§ 929P, 929Y. 
12 Section 929P explicitly provides jurisdiction to United States courts for public actions, but many 
believe that the courts already had jurisdiction over such actions, and that Dodd-Frank does not solve 
the problem that prevented the courts from hearing these actions—the merits of such claims. Compare, 
e.g., Painter, supra note 3 (discussing concerns with the effects of § 929P), and George T. Conway, 
Extraterritoriality After Dodd-Frank, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. BLOG 
(Aug. 5, 2010, 8:58 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/05/extraterritoriality-after-
dodd-frank/ (claiming that § 929P has no practical effect as written), with Zinn, supra note 3 
(acknowledging § 929P as instituting a new standard for public actions and ignoring concerns regarding 
effectiveness), and MATTHEW BENDER TREATISE ON SECURITIES PRACTICE, 1–1 Securities Practice 
Guide § 1.01 (Lorraine Massaro & Robert P. Zinn eds., 2010). 
13 Commentators appear to agree on the fact that the rule announced in Morrison will stand for private 
suits until such time as the SEC announces its findings under § 929Y and Congress chooses whether to 
act. Zinn, supra note 3. 
14 See id. 
15 Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y(c). 
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the current “transactional” test as the method of dealing with private actions, Part V 
concludes with a proposal in support of extending the standard applicable to public 
actions, the modified “conduct and effects” standard, to private actions. Lastly, Part 
VI summarizes the state of the law and the theories advanced within this note. 
II. THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND PRE-
MORRISON APPROACHES TO EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION 
The Exchange Act, in relevant part, prohibits “manipulative or deceptive 
devices” related to the purchase or sale of securities.16 Section10(b) of the 
Exchange Act prohibits devices that violate SEC rules and regulations, specifically 
Rule 10b-5, which regulates actions that have the effect of defrauding investors or 
misstating or omitting material facts regarding the purchase or sale of securities.17 
Certain provisions of the Exchange Act have been interpreted to suggest 
extraterritorial application, but there is no explicit language authorizing such 
reach.18 When also considering the general presumption that U.S. law does not 
                                                           
 
16 “It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality 
of interstate commerce . . . or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or 
any security not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device . . . in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe . . . .” Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
17 Rule 10b-5 makes it “unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities 
exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of 
a material fact or to omit to state a material fact . . . , or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business which operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or 
sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
18 See Securities Exchange Act § 10(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The Court in Morrison discussed 
previous approaches of lower courts based on certain language of the antifraud provisions that were said 
to imply extraterritorial application, but the majority rejected such implications and relied on the lack of 
an explicit grant of extraterritorial application by Congress. 130 S. Ct. at 2882. The Morrison 
concurrence was more accepting to such an implication because “[t]he text and history of § 10(b) are 
famously opaque on the question of when, exactly, transnational securities frauds fall within the 
statute’s compass.” Id. at 2888 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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apply without its borders,19 the extraterritorial reach of these basic antifraud 
provisions in transnational securities actions has been the subject of much debate.20 
Prior to the Morrison case, lower courts utilized various approaches to 
determine whether these antifraud provisions should apply to private transnational 
securities actions, many of which appeared to be primarily foreign-based claims.21 
The most common, and most often cited, of these approaches were the “conduct” 
test and the “effects” test.22 Developed by the Second Circuit, these tests were 
generally justified by the view that § 10(b) was silent as to extraterritorial reach, so 
the question became whether a court believed that the disputes were of great 
enough importance to the United States to justify the investment of resources by 
the legal system.23  
Under the effects test, a court looked to whether the “wrongful conduct had a 
substantial effect in the United States or upon United States citizens.”24 Under the 
conduct test, a court looked to whether the wrongful conduct—such as fraud, 
deceit, or misstatement of material facts—occurred in the United States.25 When 
the harmed investors were foreign (as in F-Cubed actions), the level of conduct was 
required to be more than “mere preparation” for wrongful conduct that occurs 
                                                           
 
19 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“[There is a] longstanding principle of 
American law ‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”) (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 
285 (1949)); see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
20 See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877–83. 
21 See, e.g., SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 
2869; Zoelsch v. Aurthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31–33 (D.C. Cir. 1987), abrogated by 
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 
1972), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 268 F. Supp. 385, 392 
(S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir 1968). 
22 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878–80. 
23 See id. at 2879; Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975) (“When, as here, a 
court is confronted with transactions that on any view are predominantly foreign, it must seek to 
determine whether Congress would have wished the precious resources of United States courts and law 
enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather than leave the problem to foreign countries.”), 
abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. 
24 Berger, 322 F.3d at 192–93. 
25 Id. at 193. 
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outside the country, and the conduct was required to be shown to have directly 
caused the loss to the investors.26 
These tests were generally viewed as the most accurate method of 
determining the policy-based issue of congressional intent regarding extraterritorial 
application of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act.27 Generally, other 
circuits agreed with the Second Circuit’s approach, albeit with various alterations.28 
However, the conduct and effects tests were not without their shortcomings. The 
tests did not remain independent of each other and were typically melded together 
into one general test considering factors regarding both conduct and effects, which 
made for difficult application.29 Complicating the problem was that no two cases 
could be analyzed the same way, since certain factors carried different weight in 
different situations, a dilemma that even the Second Circuit, which developed the 
tests, recognized.30 This unpredictability, coupled with the aforementioned 
difficulty in application, demonstrated that the current state of the law was far from 
ideal. Some sort of resolution was necessary, and the ultimate issue would no doubt 
primarily rest on the balance between the standard presumption against 
extraterritoriality for United States statutes and the judicial power to interpret 
congressional legislation.31 
III. THE SUPREME COURT STEPS IN: MORRISON V. NATIONAL 
AUSTRALIA BANK 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank was a rather typical private transnational 
securities action: a primarily foreign dispute with some level of connection to the 
United States where the plaintiff class is attempting to receive compensation for 
violations of U.S. securities laws. The plaintiff class consisted of Australian 
                                                           
 
26 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879. In comparison, where American investors are harmed, “merely 
preparatory” acts were found sufficient, and “it was enough that acts of ‘material importance’ performed 
in the United States ‘significantly contributed’ to that result[.]” Id. 
27 See id. at 2878–80; Berger, 322 F.3d at 192–93. 
28 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880. See also Zoelsch v. Aurthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30–33 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (criticizing the Second Circuit’s approach, but ultimately accepting the conduct and effects 
tests based on the expertise in securities law of the Second Circuit), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 
2869. 
29 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879 (explaining that the Second Circuit refused to keep the two tests distinct 
in an effort to get a better picture of United States involvement). 
30 Id. at 2879. 
31 Id. at 2880–83. 
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investors who purchased shares of National Australia Bank’s stock on a foreign 
exchange, making the suit an F-Cubed action.32 The dispute arose over alleged 
fraud committed by National Australia Bank and a mortgage servicing business it 
had acquired, HomeSide Lending, in valuating certain assets.33 While some amount 
of wrongful conduct was found to have occurred in the United States,34 the Court 
found the antifraud provisions of the Exchange Act (and consequently the related 
SEC rules) inapplicable.35 This finding against extraterritorial application 
abrogated the Second Circuit’s conduct and effects tests and instituted a 
“transactional” test in their wake.36 In doing so, the Court stressed that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality controls in the absence of express contrary 
language contained in the statute.37 In adopting the transactional test, the Court 
found that the Exchange Act was enacted to control the purchase and sale of 
securities, and thus the focus of the analysis for such situations should be on the 
place of purchase and sale rather than the place of deceptive conduct.38 Under the 
test, § 10(b) (and consequently Rule 10b-5) applies only to “securities listed on 
domestic exchanges[] and domestic transactions in other securities.”39 In Morrison, 
the Court found that National Australia Bank did not list its stock on United States 
stock exchanges and that the Australian investors neither purchased nor sold the 
                                                           
 
32 Id. at 2876. 
33 Id. at 2875–76. 
34 HomeSide Lending was originally a Florida-based company, and its headquarters remained there after 
National Australia Bank purchased the company. Id. at 2875. The alleged fraud in the case was based on 
the post-acquisition misstatement of HomeSide’s mortgage servicing assets. Id. at 2876. While some of 
this activity undoubtedly occurred in Florida, the actual reporting and dissemination of information to 
the investors occurred in Australia. Id. 
35 Id. at 2888. 
36 Id. at 2886. In addition, the Court rejected the United States’ proposed “significant and material” 
standard for the conduct test for public actions and “direct injury” standard for the conduct test for 
private actions. Id.; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6–
7; Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-11091) [hereinafter Brief for the 
United States] (discussing these proposed standards and their proper application to Morrison). 
37 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. The Court initially framed the issue in a different light than previously 
believed. This aspect of the decision continues to play a significant part in the current debate regarding 
the effectiveness of the relevant Dodd-Frank provisions. The Court held that, contrary to the Second 
Circuit’s approach, the issue of extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions in transnational 
securities actions is a question of the merits of such a claim, not the jurisdiction over the claim. Id. at 
2876–77. 
38 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 
39 Id. 
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stock in the United States, rendering the antifraud provisions inapplicable.40 The 
Court hailed this new standard as a way of eliminating the uncertainty that the 
application of the conduct and effects tests had created in the outcomes of 
transnational securities actions while maintaining both the congressional intent of 
the antifraud provisions and the canon of statutory interpretation against 
extraterritoriality.41 
IV. NOT SO FAST: CONGRESS ADDRESSES THE MATTER 
(SOMEWHAT) DIRECTLY 
The ink barely had time to dry on the Court’s Morrison opinion, an exercise 
of judicial authority intended to set the standard for debate regarding transnational 
securities actions, before Congress decided to take up the issue directly. Less than a 
month after the Morrison decision came down, Dodd-Frank passed Congress and 
was signed into law by President Barack Obama.42 The broad scope of the Act 
extends investor protections and institutes measures for reform of many publicly 
traded companies.43 More importantly for purposes of the issue at hand, the 
secondary provisions of §§ 929P and 929Y of the Act are aimed at expanding 
extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions contained in the securities 
laws.44 Section 929P directly proscribes the standard for extraterritorial application 
in public actions,45 while § 929Y provides guidance for the determination of the 
standard for private actions.46 
                                                           
 
40 Id. at 2888. 
41 Id. at 2884–88. For a discussion of the claimed and actual effects of the Morrison approach, see Scott 
Hirst, U.S. Supreme Court Rejects “Foreign Cubed” Class Actions, HARV. L. SCH. FORUM ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. BLOG (June 25, 2010, 9:23 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/ 
06/25/u-s-supreme-court-rejects-foreign-cubed-class-actions/. 
42 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (dated June 24, 2010); Dodd-Frank Act (dated July 21, 2010); 
MATTHEW BENDER TREATISE ON SECURITIES PRACTICE, supra note 12 (Dodd-Frank signed into law by 
President shortly after). 
43 MATTHEW BENDER TREATISE ON SECURITIES PRACTICE, supra note 12. 
44 Zinn, supra note 3. 
45 Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act provides jurisdiction to district courts for actions by the SEC 
or the United States “alleging a violation of [the antifraud provisions] involving—(1) conduct within the 
United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities 
transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or (2) conduct 
occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.” 
46 Section 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to “solicit public comment and thereafter 
conduct a study” to determine the extent the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act should 
extend to private actions covering the same situations as § 929P(b). 
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The express grant of jurisdiction to United States courts contained in § 929P 
for public actions is undisputed. However, the effect of this provision is far from 
certain. On its face, the provision appears to permit claims in situations that fall 
under what amounts to the modified “conduct and effects” test proposed for public 
actions in the United States’ amicus brief in Morrison.47 Application of this 
standard to public actions only is in line with what the SEC proposed to Congress 
while Dodd-Frank was being developed, suggesting the maintenance of a higher 
standard for private actions.48 The intent of Congress to achieve this result for 
public actions appears in the legislative history.49 The dispute arises from many 
who claim that the language of § 929P, which grants jurisdiction to the district 
courts, renders the provision essentially ineffective. This stance is based on the 
Court’s finding in Morrison that the issue of extraterritoriality was a question of 
merits, not jurisdiction.50 A prominent firm involved in the Morrison litigation 
explained this view in a memorandum circulated shortly after Dodd-Frank’s 
enactment, stating that Dodd-Frank does not address the substantive reach of the 
                                                           
 
47 Much of the discussion regarding Dodd-Frank has treated the § 929P standard as a return to the 
original conduct and effects tests, but an analysis of the language of the standard reveals striking 
similarity to the test proposed by the United States in Morrison. Compare Brief for the United States, 
supra note 36, at 7 (“[W]hen a transnational securities fraud involves significant and material conduct in 
the United States . . . the SEC can bring an enforcement action.”), with Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b)(1) 
(authorizing an SEC action when “conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in 
furtherance of the violation”); see also Zinn, supra note 3 (describing the language of § 929P(b)(1) as 
“very much in line with the SEC’s original proposal in Morrison”); contra Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879 
(describing the previous conduct test as “‘whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States’” 
(quoting SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 
2869)). 
48 See Zinn, supra note 3; Painter, supra note 3, at 15. For a discussion of this “dual jurisdictional” 
standard, see Brief for the United States, supra note 36, at 25–30. See also Kantor, supra note 5, at 874–
75 (discussing this approach). 
49 “This bill’s provisions concerning extraterritoriality, however, are intended to rebut [the Morrison 
transactional test] by clearly indicating that Congress intends extraterritorial application in cases brought 
by the SEC or the Justice Department. Thus, the purpose of the language of § 929P(b) of the bill is to 
make clear that in actions and proceedings brought by the SEC or the Justice Department, the specified 
provisions of . . . the Exchange Act . . . may have extraterritorial application . . . irrespective of whether 
the securities are traded on a domestic exchange or the transactions occur in the United States, when the 
conduct within the United States is significant or when conduct outside the United States has a 
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.” 156 CONG. REC. H5237 (daily ed. June 30, 
2010); see also Painter, supra note 3, at 19 (discussing Congressional intent to provide extraterritorial 
application for public actions); Zinn, supra note 3 (claiming that such an intent can be found in the 
legislative history); Conway, supra note 12 (noting the Dodd-Frank drafters’ “extra-statutory 
statements” regarding § 929P). 
50 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
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antifraud provisions, thus rendering § 929P ineffective and inconsequential.51 
Others have chosen to adopt the stance that § 929P does provide extraterritorial 
application in public actions, emphasizing the clear congressional intent over this 
allegedly ineffective plain meaning of the provision.52 
While the debate regarding public actions could be resolved by a variety of 
methods, the most likely being judicial decisions interpreting § 929P or 
congressional action altering the language or effect of the provision, the future of 
private actions under § 929Y is at once more and less discernable. What appears 
certain is that the SEC study mandated by § 929Y will be conducted with the goal 
of determining the most appropriate standard for extraterritoriality in private 
actions. Dodd-Frank sets the guidelines for the content of this study, which should 
encompass the scope of private actions that should be permitted under the standard, 
the implications of the application of such a standard on international comity,53 the 
economic costs and benefits of the potential standards, and the possibility of 
adopting a narrower standard than that applied under § 929P.54 Also, Dodd-Frank 
includes a requirement that this SEC study be submitted to Congress within 
eighteen months of the passage of the Act, at which time the recommendations 
discerned from the study must also be made.55 Barring action by the Court in 
contravention of its stance in Morrison, the standard for extraterritorial application 
of the antifraud provisions for private actions will remain the transactional test until 
this study has been concluded and Congress determines whether to institute an 
alternative standard.56 
                                                           
 
51 Conway, supra note 12. For more information regarding the basis of this stance, see Painter, supra 
note 3, at 14–24; Zinn, supra note 3; Steven M. Davidoff, How Porsche May Outmaneuver a Securities 
Suit, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Oct. 22, 2010, 11:05 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/ 
22/how-porsche-may-outmaneuver-a-securities-suit/. 
52 See Zinn, supra note 3; Painter, supra note 3. 
53 Comity is defined as “[a] practice among political entities (as nations, states, or courts of different 
jurisdictions), involving esp. mutual recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts.” BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 303 (9th ed. 2009). 
54 “The study shall consider and analyze, among other things—(1) the scope of such a private right of 
action, including whether it should extend to all private actors or whether it should be more limited to 
extend just to institutional investors or otherwise; (2) what implications such a private right of action 
would have on international comity; (3) the economic costs and benefits of extending a private right of 
action for transnational securities frauds; and (4) whether a narrower extraterritorial standard should be 
adopted.” Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y(b). 
55 Id. § 929Y(c). 
56 Zinn, supra note 3. See also Painter, supra note 3. 
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The immediate discussion concerning the extraterritoriality provisions of 
Dodd-Frank has been dominated by the dispute regarding public actions and 
§ 929P.57 There is no doubt that this focus has been well placed, considering 
§ 929P purports to have an immediate effect on transnational securities actions. In 
comparison, the potential effects of § 929Y likely will not even begin to be realized 
until the eighteen-month period allotted for the SEC study has concluded. Even 
then, the very real possibility exists that the standard will remain unaltered and 
Morrison will continue to control. However, the importance of whatever standard 
is deemed appropriate to transnational securities claims by investors cannot be 
denied. If the Morrison interpretation stands, numerous investors will be left 
without redress in American courts, which are often the only forum in which such 
actions are available.58 Public companies could possibly be emboldened with the 
idea of a lower level of accountability for fraudulent behavior.59 In contrast, a 
broader standard for extraterritoriality in private suits would likely create 
considerable costs for United States investors, businesses, and the court system.60 
Additionally, as one quoted reaction accurately portrayed, “the prospect of [the 
§ 929Y] study ‘scares a . . . number of foreign capitals,’ which ‘fear seeing the 
United States become’ a global ‘financial policeman’ through class-action 
lawsuits.”61 With such high stakes, the potential outcome and effects of § 929Y 
deserve more consideration than currently available. The remainder of this note 
attempts to provide such consideration of § 929Y through an analysis of the 
standard likely to be recommended by the SEC after its study, as well as a 
discussion of why this standard is not in fact the best solution to the issue of 
extraterritoriality of the antifraud provisions in private actions. 
                                                           
 
57 See, e.g., Zinn, supra note 3; Painter, supra note 3; Conway, supra note 12; Davidoff, supra note 51. 
58 See Letter from Ohio Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. et al. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, at 6 (Feb. 18, 
2011) [hereinafter Ohio Public Employees’ Retirement System Comments] (“[Under the transactional 
test,] an entire class of investors would be carved out of the securities laws and reserved to the SEC.”), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-16.pdf. 
59 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring) (giving a hypothetical example with 
significant fraudulent conduct and effects in the United States that could not be pursued through private 
action under the transactional test); Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of S’holder & Consumer Attorneys to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, at 15–18 (Feb. 18, 2011) [hereinafter NASCAT Comments], 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-18.pdf. 
60 See Letter from U.S. Chamber of Commerce to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 22–24 (Feb. 18, 
2011) [hereinafter U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comments], http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-
37.pdf. 
61 Conway, supra note 12 (partially quoting a Le Monde report). 
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V. WHAT TO DO WITH PRIVATE ACTIONS: THE POSSIBLE 
STANDARDS AND THE MEANINGFUL DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN WHAT IS LIKELY AND WHAT IS BEST 
A. Background: A Better Feel for Private Transnational 
Securities Actions 
In order to fully understand the debate on the appropriate standard for private 
transnational securities actions, it is important to realize the nature of these claims. 
In the transnational context, private claims arise in F-Cubed and “F-Squared” 
situations.62 Although not expressly authorized by the Exchange Act, a general 
private action has been implied from § 10b and Rule 10b-5.63 Due to the implied 
nature of this right of action, courts have read additional requirements into the 
statutory framework for private plaintiffs wishing to pursue a claim.64 In addition to 
the substantive requirements, a private claim must establish the elements of 
reliance, economic loss, and causation.65 These judicially created, private action-
specific elements have often been cited as justification for instituting and upholding 
a higher standard for extraterritorial application of the securities laws in private 
actions.66 
In the search for the appropriate standard for extraterritorial application of the 
securities laws to private transnational actions, certain policy considerations 
perpetuate the discussion. The main policy concerns are as follows: international 
comity, resource allocation, efficiency, investor protection, and availability of 
remedies.67 Virtually any discussion of extraterritoriality of the securities laws is 
incomplete without an analysis of the effects a given approach has on these policy 
concerns. Notably, such policy concerns are a significant, if not the primary, factor 
in the distinction between F-Squared actions, where the involvement of United 
                                                           
 
62 The distinction between the two types of private transnational claims exists in the plaintiff party or 
class. F-Squared actions are brought by entirely domestic plaintiff(s), while F-Cubed actions are 
instituted by wholly or partly foreign plaintiff(s). See Kantor, supra note 5. 
63 See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 152–54 (2008); Brief for the 
United States, supra note 36, at 25. 
64 See Stoneridge, 128 S. Ct. at 768; Brief for the United States, supra note 36, at 25–26. 
65 See Brief for the United States, supra note 36, at 26; Sarah S. Gold & Richard L. Spinogatti, 
Applicability to SEC of Private Action Requirements in § 10(b) Cases, 244 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2010), available 
at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202464428352. 
66 See Brief for the United States, supra note 36, at 26; Kantor, supra note 4, at 841–66. 
67 Kantor, supra note 5, at 850–61; see also Brief for the United States, supra note 36, at 26–28. 
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States investors lends stronger justification for application of the United States 
securities laws, and F-Cubed actions, where the policy concerns are often used to 
reject extraterritoriality where foreign investors are involved.68 Recognizing the 
importance of these specific policy concerns, the SEC explicitly instructed those 
submitting comments under the § 929Y study to include discussion of the potential 
effects of proposed standards for private actions on such policy concerns.69 
The two most commonly cited standards for application to private 
transnational securities claims, the transactional test as announced in Morrison and 
the modified conduct-and-effects test as announced for public actions in § 929P of 
Dodd-Frank, are discussed at length throughout this note.70 While it is possible to 
approach the issue of private actions by considering only these two standards, a 
thorough analysis should at least acknowledge the potential alternatives. In its 
amicus brief in Morrison, the United States first announced its recommended 
standard for private suits, which required a heightened level of conduct from public 
suits.71 This “direct injury” standard remains a viable alternative that must be 
considered along with the other potential standards. Another possible approach is to 
deny application of the securities laws to private transnational securities actions, 
leaving enforcement solely to the SEC and international suits. Although this 
approach has not received much support, it is theoretically possible, especially 
considering the implied nature of the private actions and the strong policy concerns 
present.72 Lastly, there exists some support for an intermediate standard that would 
allow a private action to be brought by United States investors under the modified 
conduct-and-effects test, but not in F-Cubed situations, regardless of the relevant 
conduct or effects.73 
B. The SEC Study: The Comments Are in, Now It Is the SEC’s 
Move 
As part of the § 929Y study, the SEC solicited comments from any interested 
parties regarding their opinions on the appropriate standard to be presented to 
Congress in January 2012. After setting a deadline of February 18, 2011 for receipt 
                                                           
 
68 See, e.g., Kantor, supra note 5, at 841, 871–72. 
69 Request for Comments from SEC on Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action 5–8 (Oct. 25, 
2010) [hereinafter Request for Comments], http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/34-63174.pdf. 
70 See supra Parts II & III. 
71 Brief for the United States, supra note 36, at 25–28. 
72 See supra notes 63–69. 
73 See infra note 78. 
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of these comments, the SEC received fifty-one submissions from interested 
parties.74 The parties offering comments included multiple foreign governments, 
the United States Chamber of Commerce, numerous public pension funds and 
investment houses, various law firms, a group of forty-two law professors, other 
academics, and an individual who had been personally harmed by securities 
fraud.75 The recommendations in the comment letters can be grouped into three 
general categories. These categories consist of recommendations for maintaining 
the current standard of the transactional test,76 for extending the § 929P standard of 
a modified conduct-and-effects test,77 and for instituting a type of intermediate 
standard permitting only United States investors to pursue private transnational 
securities claims.78 
A clear minority of the commenting parties recommended the intermediate 
standard.79 While this standard initially appears to have its benefits, it is hard to 
imagine that the SEC would recommend such a standard and, even assuming it did, 
that Congress would choose to adopt such an approach. The theory behind the 
intermediate standard is that by allowing United States investors to pursue private 
actions through the antifraud provisions, the concerns of investor protection and 
                                                           
 
74 See Request for Comments, supra note 69 (explaining the process and deadline for submitting 
comments). For a list of all the parties submitting comments and links to the relevant documents, see 
SEC, Comments on Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-
617/4-617.shtml (last modified Feb. 17, 2012). 
75 See Comments on Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, supra note 74. 
76 See, e.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comments, supra note 60 (writing in support of what is 
described as the “transactional,” or “bright line,” test); Letter from Gov’t of the U.K. to Elizabeth M. 
Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 3–4 (Feb. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Gov’t of the U.K. Comments], 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-4.pdf. 
77 See, e.g., NASCAT Comments, supra note 59, at 2; Letter from Robert P. Bartlett, III et al. to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 5 (Feb. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Forty-Two Law Professors’ 
Comments] (comments by forty-two law professors recommending the extension of § 929P standard to 
private actions), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-28.pdf. 
78 See, e.g., Letter from Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. et al. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 1 
(Feb. 18, 2011) [hereinafter Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. Comments], http://www.sec.gov/comments/ 
4-617/4617-13.pdf (suggesting such an intermediate standard); Ohio Public Employees’ Retirement 
System Comments, supra note 58, at 1–2 (same). 
79 Four comment letters recommended a private action available for U.S. investors only, with one of 
those letters being submitted by the Maryland State Retirement and Pension System, who also signed on 
to the California State Teachers’ Retirement System Comments. See sources cited supra note 77; see 
also Letter from Comptroller of the State of N.Y. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-11.pdf; Letter from Maryland State Ret. & Pension Sys. to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-9.pdf. 
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availability of remedies would be addressed, considering the United States is 
concerned with these issues primarily for United States investors.80 Also, by 
limiting the claims to solely United States investors, significantly fewer judicial 
resources would be expended than by allowing a broader standard for private 
actions.81 Lastly, as the theory goes, this intermediate standard would not raise the 
same international comity concerns that a broader standard would, considering that 
all the United States is doing is providing a method of relief to its own citizens 
harmed by fraud or misrepresentation.82 
The flaws in this approach are apparent given the inaccuracies in the policy 
analysis. The appropriateness of this intermediate standard should be considered in 
light of the overarching goals of the antifraud provisions of the securities law: fraud 
deterrence and investor protection.83 Protecting only U.S. investors does not 
advance this goal as well as proponents of the intermediate approach insist, as 
deterrence is best served when the fraudulent acts can lead to liability in situations 
beyond those in which only domestic investors are harmed.84 Also, the strict line 
drawn between domestic and foreign investors may not be the best method of 
achieving justice in situations involving securities fraud with a connection to the 
United States. Finally, and most importantly, the support for the proposition that 
international comity concerns are wholly non-existent where a United States 
investor is involved, yet they remain where a foreign investor is harmed even if the 
conduct-and-effects test would be met, is lacking.85 As a whole, this intermediate 
approach appears to mitigate certain effects of the other approaches but does not 
provide a legitimate solution, as it leads to insufficient investor protection as well 
as potential continuing concerns regarding international comity.  
Maintenance of the current standard, the transactional test from Morrison, 
which is sometimes referred to as the “bright line” test, is supported by 
                                                           
 
80 See Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. Comments, supra note 78, at 6. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 13–14. 
83 See Brief for the United States, supra note 36, at 6. 
84 See infra Part V.C. 
85 Compare Cal. State Teachers’ Ret. Sys. Comments, supra note 78, at 13–14 (discussing reduced 
international comity concerns over the intermediate standard), with NASCAT Comments, supra note 59, 
at 5–7 (addressing the extent of comity concerns arising from extension of the § 929P standard), and 
Letter from AGEST Superannuation Fund et al. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 10-13 (Feb. 18, 
2011) [hereinafter Superannuation Fund Comments] (same). 
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approximately one half of the remaining comment letters86 and is the standard the 
SEC is most likely to recommend. As expected, this approach was advocated by all 
of the foreign governments that submitted comment letters on the subject.87 
Additionally, other notable parties supporting maintenance of the transactional test 
in their comment letters include the United States Chamber of Commerce, the 
European Union, and the international law firm White & Case LLP.88 After 
consideration of the policy rationale behind this approach, as well as the identities 
of the proponents of such an approach, it becomes evident why it would be the 
preferred, and therefore the most likely, approach to be recommended by the SEC 
under § 929Y.  
The primary policy rationale in support of the maintenance of the 
transactional test is the same concern for international comity and sovereignty of 
foreign nations that was previously announced by the Supreme Court in 
Morrison.89 As described by the government of France, expansion of the private 
right of action would violate principles of international comity because such 
actions would “substantially interfer[e] with the sovereign interests, policies, and 
laws of other nations.”90 This concern has remained central to the issue of the 
applicable standard of extraterritoriality of the antifraud provisions of the securities 
laws for private actions throughout its recent history. The strong resistance to 
extending the private right of action, as presented by foreign nations in their 
comment letters, echoes the approach taken by many of the same nations in amicus 
briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in Morrison.91 Generally, this approach 
emphasizes the interest foreign nations possess in regulation of their own 
companies and the important distinctions between their own laws and the United 
                                                           
 
86 From my interpretations of the comment letters, approximately seventeen to twenty can be read to 
support this proposition, while the same number can be read to support the recommendation of a similar 
§ 929P conduct-and-effects test for private actions. See Comments on Study on Extraterritorial Private 
Rights of Action, supra note 74. 
87 For an entire list of these foreign governments, which includes France, Australia, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, and the United Kingdom, see id. 
88 Id. 
89 See Gov’t of the U.K. Comments, supra note 76, at 2–4; U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comments, 
supra note 60, at 2–4, 10–22. 
90 Letter from Gov’t of Fr. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 3 (Feb. 17, 2011) [hereinafter Gov’t of 
Fr. Comments], http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-29.pdf. 
91 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2885–86 (“[The foreign nations] all complain of the interference with foreign 
securities regulation that application of § 10(b) abroad would produce, and urge the adoption of a clear 
test that will avoid that consequence.”). 
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States model for class action suits.92 The SEC, as a government agency, must 
remain acutely aware of the concerns of foreign nations in order to preserve 
relationships with other governments. The need for preservation of such 
relationships, from both a governmental policy and a practical perspective, is 
magnified in a field such as securities law where solely domestic issues are 
becoming increasingly less common.93 In the United States amicus brief endorsed 
by the SEC in Morrison, the Commission stressed the greater comity concerns 
presented by private actions while noting that such concerns were lessened or 
absent in the case of public actions.94 While the issue of international comity and 
the concerns of foreign nations are not determinative for the SEC’s 
recommendation, their role in the decision-making process is undeniable. 
Another significant policy consideration that factors into the determination of 
the applicable standard for private actions is a result of the explicit grant of 
authority for public actions in § 929P.95 By reaffirming the authority of the SEC 
and DOJ to institute public actions, Congress has assured the SEC that its power 
will subsist no matter what standard is adopted for private actions. The parties 
supporting the transactional test in their comment letters appear notably more 
confident in the effect of public enforcement of the antifraud provisions of the 
securities laws than the parties suggesting alternative standards.96 The United 
States Chamber of Commerce describes the public enforcement mechanisms as 
                                                           
 
92 In its comment letter, White & Case reiterates a point made by the United Kingdom and Northern 
Ireland in their amicus briefs in Morrison that “nations have a strong interest in regulating their own 
capital markets, developing disclosure rules to govern their own issuers, deciding how and when class 
action shareholder litigation should occur and determining the penalties for violations of such laws.” 
Letter from White & Case LLP to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 3 (Feb. 17, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-3.pdf. 
93 See, e.g., Letter from Richard W. Painter, Professor of Corporate Law, Univ. of Minn. Law School, to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 1–2 (Feb. 17, 2011) (supporting the transactional test based in part on 
“the fact that diplomatic and other disruption caused by f-cubed securities litigation could make it very 
difficult for the SEC to get cooperation from foreign securities regulators to pursue transnational 
securities fraud”), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-7.pdf. 
94 Brief for the United States, supra note 36, at 26–27. 
95 U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comments, supra note 60, at 2, 5–8 (“Our country has the toughest 
administrative enforcement of securities laws in the world, and the [SEC and DOJ] received new, 
express extraterritorial enforcement authority in Section 929P.”). 
96 Compare id. at 24–26 (“[P]ublic enforcement is more effective than private securities litigation.”), 
with Letter from London Pensions Fund Auth. et al. to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC 2 (Feb. 18, 
2011) [hereinafter London Pensions Funds Comments] (“No one disputes that the limited resources 
available to the Commission renders the private enforcement of the federal securities laws a necessary 
tool to combat the scourge of securities fraud.”), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-39.pdf. 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 
P A G E  |  4 1 6  |  V O L U M E  7 3  ( 2 0 1 1 )   
 
“far-reaching and potent,”97 while the government of the United Kingdom 
classifies the ability to bring public actions as “the necessary powers to pursue 
cross-border securities fraud.”98 An SEC view of its own enforcement powers 
would presumably be comparable to these descriptions, as the Commission has 
previously endorsed its preference for public actions over private actions.99 With 
such a positive view of the effectiveness of public actions in deterrence of 
securities fraud, the risks of rejecting expansion of the scope of private actions in 
order to address the international comity concerns appear minimal. 
The justification for the transactional test also includes consideration of the 
cost-benefit analysis, as instructed under § 929Y.100 According to proponents of 
this approach, the potential benefits of instituting a broader standard for private 
actions are generally limited to better compensation for injured investors, a benefit 
that appears unnecessary when viewed in light of the claimed effectiveness of 
public actions.101 This potential benefit appears even less significant when one is 
reminded that investors who purchase securities on United States exchanges are 
still afforded the ability to pursue a private action. Proponents of applying the 
transactional test to § 929Y view the costs of expansion of private actions as 
numerous, including unnecessary use of judicial resources,102 high costs to United 
States investors and businesses,103 and reduction of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in United States capital markets.104 Again, in the government agency context in 
which the SEC operates, an approach which purports to preserve resources (both 
financial and administrative) while maintaining or promoting investment in 
domestic markets appears particularly appealing and thus furthers the likelihood of 
support by the Commission. 
The analysis of the standard most likely to be chosen by the SEC would be 
incomplete without addressing why this standard is more probable than the direct-
                                                           
 
97 U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comments, supra note 60, at 2. 
98 Gov’t of the U.K. Comments, supra note 76, at 7. 
99 See Brief for the United States, supra note 36, at 13–30. 
100 Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y(b). 
101 See U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comments, supra note 60, at 2, 5–8; Letter from Secs. Indus. & Fin. 
Mkts. Ass’n & Ass’n for Fin. Mkts. in Europe to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, at 21–22 (Feb. 18, 
2011), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-15.pdf. 
102 U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comments, supra note 60, at 22–24. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 33–40. 
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injury test first recommended by the United States in its amicus brief in the 
Morrison case.105 Notwithstanding the justification for the transactional test, the 
common-sense presumption exists that the test explicitly endorsed by the SEC 
previously would remain preferable. However, it is important to note that this 
standard was not supported by any of the numerous comment letters that were 
submitted to the Commission.106 While the SEC is in no way bound to select a 
recommendation based on these comment letters, the lack of support for the 
standard is at least relevant. In determining an appropriate standard to recommend, 
the SEC should consider the likelihood of Congress adopting the standard. Without 
any support from the commenting parties, the SEC would be hard-pressed to 
convince Congress through its recommendation that the direct-injury test was 
appropriate. Additionally, that same amicus brief suggested what is basically the 
standard adopted in § 929P for public action.107 If Congress had deemed that the 
SEC’s opinion on the appropriate standard for private actions, standing alone, was 
sufficient to adopt the direct-injury test, why not simply adopt that standard in 
§ 929Y initially? By requiring the study mandated in § 929Y, Congress seems to 
have desired a stronger basis for determining the appropriate scope of private 
actions. Unless the remainder of the SEC study compiles convincing evidence 
supporting the direct-injury test, that standard is unlikely to surpass the 
transactional test as the Commission’s ultimate recommendation to Congress under 
§ 929Y. 
C. The Need for a Broader Private Action: Why the SEC Should 
Recommend the Extension of the Section 929P Standard to 
Private Actions 
The beneficial features of the transactional test for private actions are well 
documented,108 but careful consideration of the policy concerns and effects of the 
potential standards reveals that extension of the § 929P public action standard to 
private actions is the best possible approach. The quantity of parties submitting 
comment letters reaching this realization is comparable to those recommending the 
transactional test.109 The parties recommending extension of the § 929P standard 
include a group of forty-two law professors, domestic and international public 
                                                           
 
105 Brief for the United States, supra note 36, at 25–28. 
106 See Comments on Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, supra note 74. 
107 Compare Brief for the United States, supra note 36, at 13–25, with Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y(b). 
108 See supra Part V.B. 
109 See supra note 86. 
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pension funds, various other institutional investors, and the National Association of 
Shareholder and Consumer Attorneys.110 The superior level of investor protection 
and fraud deterrence offered by application of the modified conduct-and-effects test 
in § 929P to private actions is both desirable and attainable. The protection offered 
by public actions alone is insufficient,111 and the international comity concerns with 
instituting such a standard, while present, are inflated by proponents of the 
transactional test.112 And while certain increased costs would be an unavoidable 
reality in instituting a broader private action, the benefit of significant protection 
for investors cannot be outweighed by frugality. Although unlikely to prevail as the 
Commission’s recommended standard or as the standard ultimately adopted by 
Congress, the extension of the § 929P standard to private actions remains the most 
appropriate approach.  
The extension of the § 929P standard to private actions would allow the SEC 
and private litigants to achieve enhanced results in the deterrence of fraud and 
protection of investors.113 This complimentary relationship, in which the United 
States is enforcing the public interest while private litigants are actively seeking 
compensation for harm, is a far more effective approach than conferring sole 
enforcement power on the limited resources of the government.114 Even if one 
accepts the claims by proponents of the transactional test that SEC enforcement is 
more effective than private action,115 there is no substitute for the deterrent effect 
from the potential for enhanced liability through a broader private action.116 Under 
the current standard, a company can take solace in the frightening truth that it can 
only be held liable under the antifraud provisions of the United States securities 
                                                           
 
110 See Comments on Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, supra note 74. 
111 See London Pension Funds Comments, supra note 96; Letter from Kirby McInerney LLP to 
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, at 7–8 (Feb. 17, 2011) (describing the SEC as “underbudgeted, 
understaffed, overburdened”), http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-33.pdf. 
112 See Letter from DRRT to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC, at 3–4 (Feb. 15, 2011) [hereinafter 
DRRT Comments], http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-2.pdf; NASCAT Comments, supra note 
58, at 5–9. 
113 London Pension Funds Comments, supra note 96, at 2–3. 
114 See id.; DRRT Comments, supra note 112, at 2–3; Superannuation Fund Comments, supra note 85, 
at 6–8 (“It is unrealistic to expect that the SEC has the resources to police all securities frauds on its 
own. If the SEC is authorized under Dodd-Frank to police transactional frauds, it is essential that 
investors be given a private right of action to supplement the SEC’s efforts.”), http://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/4-617/4617-42.pdf. 
115 See supra notes 95–99. 
116 DRRT Comments, supra note 112, at 2–4. 
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laws if its securities are listed on a domestic exchange, its securities are part of a 
domestic purchase, or its actions are so detrimental or offensive that the SEC 
chooses to apply its limited resources to institute a suit. Those who support 
maintenance of the current standard frame this issue as a positive aspect, as it allays 
the fears of foreign companies that they will be somewhat unknowingly subjected 
to a suit under United States securities laws.117 Unfortunately, in promoting this 
desirable but secondary benefit, the current standard is performing inadequately in 
achieving the primary goal of the antifraud provisions of the securities laws.118 By 
extending the scope of private actions under the modified conduct-and-effects test, 
the focus would be appropriately returned to the deterrence of fraud and protection 
of investors. 
The most common justification for rejection of an extension of the scope of 
private actions is the international comity concerns that arise from extraterritorial 
application of the securities laws.119 The general approach advanced by foreign 
nations, as shown by the comment letters submitted to the SEC,120 is 
overwhelmingly in favor of maintaining the current limited standard of 
extraterritorial application. However, any assumption that a comparable private 
action standard to § 929P is so contrary to international comity as to require 
rejection of such a standard is premature. It is important for one to remember that 
the effect of § 929P is to institute a modified conduct-and-effects test for public 
actions.121 By extending this standard to private actions, the ability of private 
litigants to bring primarily foreign-based suits would remain limited to instances of 
significant domestic conduct or substantial domestic effects.122 Such a standard 
does not implicate the concerns assumed to be inherent in the original, broad 
conduct and effects tests.123 The narrower scope of this test ensures that a material 
component of the fraud, in the form of either significant conduct or foreseeable 
substantial effects, is domestic and thus does not raise the same policy concerns as 
                                                           
 
117 E.g., U.S. Chamber of Commerce Comments, supra note 60, at 4, 33–38. 
118 See supra notes 113–14. 
119 See supra notes 89–94. 
120 See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
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pure extraterritorial application of United States laws.124 As such, the minimized 
comity concerns must be balanced with the enhanced investor protection and 
deterrence benefits. 
Additionally, those with concerns surrounding the effects of a broader 
standard for private actions on foreign nations must also consider the related issue 
that a comparable standard to § 929P would permit private actions that are not 
limited to United States investors.125 All nations, albeit to varying degrees, possess 
and pursue an interest in deterrence of securities fraud and protection of 
investors.126 By expanding the scope of the private right of action to that of § 929P, 
the United States would not be sacrificing the sovereignty of foreign nations for the 
sake of compensating its own investors, but rather providing remedies for both 
foreign and domestic investors for harm caused by fraudulent activities with an 
adequate level of connection to the United States.127 To ensure the adequacy of this 
connection, Congress has chosen language instituting the modified conduct-and-
effects standard over the original.128 When the potential inadequacy of available 
remedies for both domestic and foreign investors abroad is also considered,129 the 
extension of private right of action is revealed as a necessary method of promoting 
and enforcing an international goal rather than an infringement on principles of 
international comity and sovereignty.130 
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From a cost-benefit perspective, the superiority of the modified conduct-and-
effects test over the transactional test is apparent. The risks of extending a private 
right of action comparable to § 929P exist primarily in the economic and judicial 
resource concerns.131 Regarding judicial resources, the costs are mitigated by the 
limitations inherent in the requirements of significant conduct or foreseeable 
substantial effects, as much of the potential for frivolous suits present with the 
general conduct and effects standards is reduced.132 Also, various judicial 
mechanisms are available to aid in the reduction of the amount of judicial resources 
expended for private actions lacking merit.133 The perceived economic risks of 
extension of the private right of action, mainly that the threat of private action 
would deter companies from doing business in the United States and reduce FDI, 
are at least equaled by the economic benefits offered to the United States financial 
markets. In the current global economy, where securities are routinely purchased 
on foreign exchanges arbitrarily by United States investors,134 where the practice of 
cross-listed securities is prevalent,135 where United States institutional investors are 
functionally required to invest in foreign securities,136 and where investor 
protections in foreign nations are uncertain,137 the importance of the benefits 
provided to investors under a standard for private actions comparable to § 929P is 
immeasurable. Lastly, while the transactional test has received praise from some 
for its predictability,138 the necessity for the courts to determine the relevant 
interpretation of the § 929P standard, as applicable to public actions, already exists 
as the legislation has only recently been enacted. Therefore, by extending this 
standard to private actions, predictability would actually be increased, as 
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transnational securities actions, whether public or private, would be governed by 
one common standard rather than the current dual-standard approach. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The extraterritorial application of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange 
Act is a complicated issue that affects numerous constituents and, not surprisingly, 
is the subject of passionate disagreement. The issue appeared sufficiently settled by 
years of analysis by the circuit courts but was upended by the Morrison decision, 
which was subsequently altered by Dodd-Frank. Unfortunately, the state of private 
transnational securities actions will not be settled until well after the January 2012 
deadline for the § 929Y SEC study. At the present time, the SEC study appears 
likely to include a recommendation for the maintenance of the transactional test as 
the standard for private actions, based on conceptions of international comity 
concerns and the sufficiency of public action under § 929P. However, this 
recommendation should place proper emphasis on the goals of investor protection 
and fraud deterrence, and recommend extension of the § 929P standard and its 
modified conduct-and-effects test to private actions in lieu of the transactional test. 
 
